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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
STEPHEN MICHAEL VAN DAM,

Case No.
12050

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appeal from a verdict of guiity to a charge of rape,
rendered in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Aldon J.
Anderson, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County of the crime of rape, and
was sentenced to the statutory period.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the District
Court should be affirmed.

2

STATJ<"JMENT OF FACTS
On December 2, 1969, Linda Sue Laws was cleaning
her house and tending her two children (T. 8). Mrs. Laws
lives at 4325 South 9th East, Salt Lake City, Utah. At approximately 1 :00 p.m. Mrs. Laws observed Stephen Michael
Van Dam, the appellant, walk up to the apartment behind
her (T. 10). About five or ten minutes later the appellant,
wearing the same coat, knocked on Mrs. Laws' door and
asked if he could borrow a telephone book (T. 11). Mrs.
Laws went to her bedroom to get the telephone book and
found the appellant had followed her into the bedroom and
shut the door (T. 12). The appellant then pulled a knife
on Mrs. Laws and said "Do what I tell you or I'll kill you"
(T. 12). Van Dam then forced Mrs. Laws on the bed where
he took off her boots and levis (T. 12). He then made her
put a pillow case over her head while he proceeded to unbutton her blouse and rip open her brassiere (T. 13). Van
Dam then had intercourse and climaxed (T. 12, 39). Mrs.
Laws testified that she only saw the knife when the appellant threatened her (T. 36), but that she was very afraid he
would hurt her or one of her two children ages 11/2 and
3(T.12).
The whole amount of time involved in the rape (from
him entering the house until leaving) took about five minutes (T. 42).
After the appellant had gone Mrs. Laws waited a
couple of minutes and then ran over to her neighbor, Mrs.
Rita Weber (T. 11). Mrs. Weber comforted Mrs. Laws for
ten or fifteen minutes, then sat her down in the living room
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and gave her a cup of coffee and some aspirin (T. 179).
Mr. Weber got a description of the rapist and went looking
for him while Mrs. Weber called Mr. Laws and the police
(T. 179). The police received the call at 1:48 p.m. (T. 63).
Mrs. Weber testified she called the police about 20 minutes
after Mrs. Laws came over.
The police arrived and took Mrs. Laws to Cottonwood
Hospital where a physician verified that Mrs. Laws had
had intercourse within 6-8 hours (T. 7). The police also
took the bedsheet, pillowcase and other items of evidence
from the Laws' home and sent them to the F. B. I. laboratory (T. 66).
On the basis of a Salt Lake County Grand Jury indictment, the appellant, Stephen Michael Van Dam, was arrested. After being arrested, police officers took a knife
and appellant's coat and sent them to the F. B. I. laboratory ( T. 67).
An F. B. I. agent, who is an expert in the hair and
fiber field, testified that he examined the fibers of the
appellant's coat and those fibers on Mrs. Laws' bed sheet.
The agent then testified that the fibers from Mrs. Laws'
bed sheet matched perfectly with the appellant's coat (T.
96, 97). The agent also testified that fibers from two identical coats could match only if the coats were worn approximately the same amount of time and had been subject to
the same external factors such as wearing or dry cleaning
(T. 100).
The appellant testified that he had been home from
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work that day because of a back ailment, but had been in
his grandmother's basement (where he lived) the whole
time the rape occurred, i.e., from 12 :45 p.m. to approximately 1 :30 p.m. (T. 123, 124). The appellant's grandmother testified that she was upstairs sewing, and although
she did not see the appellant while the rape transpired, she
claims to have heard him (T. 135). Appellant's grandmother also testified that she did not see the appellant leave
the apartment from 12 :00 noon, until approximately 1 :30
p.m. when she saw him outside working on his car (T. 138).
Elaine Van Dam, Esther Lazenby Dickey, and Rosanna
Pitts all testified to seeing the appellant after 1 :30 p.m.
After hearing all the evidence, the jury, on January
27, 1970, returned a verdict of guilty of rape.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT FOLLOWED UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-38-3 (1953) vVHEN IT REFUSED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
The court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial
for the appellant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-3 (1953) lists
specific grounds for granting a new trial and states that
new trials may be granted for these reasons only.
According to the statute the appellant has no basis
for receiving a new trial. Appellant bases his contention
for a new trial on two pieces of missing evidence, to-wit:
a torn brassiere and the knife used by appellant. The stat-
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ute says nothing about missing evidence. The statute does
talk about new evidence, but even the new evidence must
meet certain criteria before a new trial can be granted.
The appellant uses cases dealing with new evidence
and states that the knife and torn brassiere were new evidence because they were missing at trial. Every case decided by the Supreme Court of Utah has held that the new
evidence, to qualify as new evidence under Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-38-3 ( 1953), must not have been known or discovered
before trial. State v. Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 16 P. 2d 713
( 1932) is one of the early cases that ruled on this statute:
"Newly discovered evidence to authorize a new
trial must not only not have been known before trial,
but also it must appear that it could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at trial." Id. at 31.
A recent Utah Supreme Court decision reaffirms that same
view.

"Newly discovered evidence, to be the grounds
for a new trial must fulfill the following requirements: ( 1) it must be such as could not, with reasonable diligence hwoe been discovered and produced
at trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; (3)
it must be suc:h as to render a different result probable of the retrial of the case." State v. Gellatly, 22
Utah 2d 149, 449 P. 2d 993 (1969).
These cases do not talk in terms of missing evidence, but
in terms of new evidence which was not known about at
trial. The missing brassiere and knife were evidence that
could be discovered or found before the trial. Both appel-
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lant and respondent talked about the knife and brassiere
at trial - the only thing lacking was their physical presence. All participants in the trial were fully cognizant of
the knife and brassiere. The evidence therefore could not
qualify as newly discovered evidence.
Another of the criteria for granting a new trial for
newly discovered evidence is that the evidence "raise a
reasonable presumption that result of second trial would
be different from the first." State v. M01dgomery, 37 Utah
515, 109 P. 815 at 816 ( 1910). If anything, the evidence
that was missing in this case would only point to appellant's guilt. Physical presence of a torn brassiere in a rape
case could do nothing but help the state show the force used
on the victim when the rape took place. The torn brassiere
would not have changed the decision of the jury. If anything, it would substantiate to the jury the fact that the
victim was raped.
The second item of missing evidence was a knife found
in appellant's car. The knife, whether missing or not, could
have done little to render a decision in favor of appellant.
At best it could be determined that the missing knife was
not the one appellant used to force Mrs. Laws to have intercourse. But that would not mean the appellant was innocent. He could have used another knife and thrown it away
- or simply had more than one knife available to him.
Presence of the knife in court could, in fact, verify that the
knife in appellant's car was similar or exactly the same as
the one used to force Linda Laws into intercourse. There
is no basis for arguing- that the physical evidence of the
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knife would have an effect on the outcome of the trial. The
knife could in no way change the decision by the jury
against appellant, it could only enforce it.
Appellant's first point is without merit. The evidence
cited as new evidence was actually evidence that was missing at the time of trial. Even if appellant's claimed evidence was considered new evidence, it would not raise a
presumption that second trial would have a different outcome than the first - which is the essential criteria for
allowing a new trial.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF RAPE AND MUST BE UPHELD BY
THE SUPREME COURT.
There is ample evidence to support appellant's conviction of rape. Mrs. Laws, the victim, identified the appellant
from pictures before arrest and F. B. I. agents testified
that fibers taken from Mrs. Laws sheet and pillow case
were identical to fibers taken from appellant's coat. Based
on this evidence the court found appellant guilty.
Mrs. Laws' positive identification that appellant,
Stephen Van Dam, had forcefully raped her, is enough in
and of itself to convict appellant. California courts have
held:
"On issue of identity, testimony of one competent witness who had identified defendant as the
perpetrator of crime is sufficient to sustain a guilty
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verdict." People v. Rodriquez, 169 C. A. 2d 771, 338
P. 2d 41at45 ( 1959).
The forceful rape of Mrs. Laws took place at approximately
1 :00 p.m. and Mrs. Laws had a chance to observe the rapist,
out in the yard, talking to him at her door, and in the bedroom while on the bed. Mrs. Laws' positive identification
of the defendant in court is based on prolonged face to
face confrontations occurring in broad daylight.
"Where opportunity for positive identification
is good and witness is positive in his identification,
which is not weakened by prior failure to identify,
but remains, even after cross-examination, positive
and unqualified, testimony of identification need
not be received with caution but may be treated
as the statement of a fact." Melot v. State, ______ Oki.
Cir. ______ , 375 P. 2d 343 at 350 (1962).
Mrs. Laws' identification of appellant remains unquestioned
and her identifying appellant as the rapist should be treated
as a fact.
F. B. I. agents' testimony that fibers from appellant's
coat were exactly the same as some taken from Mrs. Laws'
sheet and pillow case is also positive evidence that appellant
committed the crime. Police officer Sid Elliot took the
sheet where the rape occurred and sent it back to the F. B. I.
laboratory in Washington. Later, appellant's coat was also
sent to the F. B. I. laboratory in Washington. Experts from
the laboratory came to the trial and testified that fibers
from appellant's coat matched exactly those taken from
the sheet where the rape occurred (T. 96, 97). The expert
further testified that other coats could have exactly the
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same fibers only if the coats were from the same manufacturer, made from the same manufacturing lot or group,
worn approximately the same amount of time and had been
subject to the same external factors such as dry cleaning
(T. 100).
There was and is ample evidence to sustain appellant's
conviction. Mrs. Laws' positive identification of Stephen
Michael Van Dam as the rapist coupled with expert testimony that fibers from appellant's coat matched perfectly
fibers taken from the sheet and pillow case where the rape
occurred, are ample evidence to convict appellant for the
crime of rape.
In this case a reading of the entire record shows beyond a reasonable doubt the appellant's guilt. Not only is
there no reasonable doubt, there is no doubt at all. In State
v. Valdez, HI Utah 2d 426, 432 P. 2d 53 (1967), the court
stated that once a fair trial had been afforded the appellants, and a verdict supported by the evidence has been
rendered, " . . . the proceedings are presumed to be valid;
and we are not disposed to reverse for mere technicalities
or regularities unless they put the defendant at some substantial disadvantage or had some material bearing on the
fairness of the proceedings or its outcome." Id. at 429, 434
P. 2d at 55. (Emphasis added.) The Utah statutes are in
accord:
"After hearing an appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects which
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
If error has been committed, it shall not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court must
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be satisfied that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the judgment." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-42-1 (1953). See also Sfote v. Seymour, 18
Utah 2d 153, 417 P. 2d 655 (1966).
The appellant has failed to show any substantial prejudice and therefore the presumption of validity must stand.
The appellant \Vas given a fair trial, and the jury rendered
a guilty verdict supported by clear and convincing evidence.
POINT III.
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE FACT THAT LINDA SUE LAWS WAS
FORCEFULLY RAPED.
Appellant would have us believe that Mrs. Laws wilfully submitted to the rape. He cites the fact that: Mrs.
Laws only saw the knife before she was raped; that Mrs.
Laws made no effort to close her legs; and that Mrs. Laws
failed to scream while the rape was going on. What appellant fails to state is that both of Mrs. Laws' children, ages
18 months and 3 years, were present in the house while the
rape occurred.
The facts clearly show that Mrs. Laws was forcefully
raped. The appellant entered the house, produced a long
shiny knife (T. 12), and told Mrs. Laws "do what I tell you
or I'll kill you" (T. 11). Mrs. Laws' 18 month old child
was in the front room with her when she answered the door
and was left to roam the house while the rape occurred.
The other child was asleep in the bedroom. Mrs. Laws testified that she was afraid that Van Dam would hurt her
or her kids (T. 12). A mother's fear for her children plus
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fear for her own safety in this situation is obvious and
overcomes any question of whether or not the rape was
forced.
Mrs. Laws, seeing the knife and realizing the danger,
did not dare make any resistance to the rape. She did everything surrounding circumstances would allow her to do.
As stated by appellant in State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162,
364 P. 2d 109 (1961).
"The old rule of 'resistance to the upmost' is
obsolete. The law does not require that the woman
shall do more than her age, strength, the surrounding facts and all attending circumstances make it
reasonable for her to do in order to manifest her
opposition." Id. at 166.
The facts indicate that Linda Sue Laws, in light of the
knife, the threat on her life and her children was helpless
against the forceful onslaught of the appellant.
Each criminal act of rape is different and the degree
of restraint necessary for the woman varies with the peculiar circumstances of each case. In Mrs. Laws' circumstances
she had to think of her children, and any mother confronted
with the same situation would have acted exactly the same.
As held in State v. Kahnnahana, 48 Haw. 384, 402 P. 2d
679 (1965):
"Resistance in law of rape is a relative term
and the degree of resistance required varies with
the peculiar circumstances of each case." Id. at 682.
Mrs. Laws was helpless under the existing circumstances to resist the forceful rape, and appellant acting on
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the circumstances he created forced Mrs. Laws to submit
to intercourse.
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the lower
court decision should be affirmed. Appellant was given a
fair and impartial trial. Through the evidence presented
and the testimony given, all of which were completely
proper and justified, it is apparent that appellant was
guilty of the crime of rape.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

